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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MILAN M. BOYCE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendants-Appellant.

Case No.
12308

Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff-respondent, as owner by Deed and
Assignment, dated during condemnation proceedings,
of condemnee Anderson's property and rights, sued for
elimination of access caused by defendant's highway construction. The State as defendant moved to dismiss
claiming previous condemnation precluded instant suit
by res judicata. Plaintiff responded that access to remaining property, promised by the state, was eliminated
and the damage not compensated for.
I

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court denied the State's motion to dis.
miss and was granted interlocutory appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of lower
court's order denying the State's motion to dismiss and a
chance to prove his case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the instant case Civil No. 195372, plaintiff al·
leges "through certain mesne conveyances," R-1, which
have not yet become a part of the record, ownership of
certain property, acquired, allegedly with any damage
rights against the state, from owners already at bar in
previous condemnation suit No. 187531.
Contrary to the state's statement of facts, defend·
ant's brief page 4, plaintiff, as purchaser of condemnee
and title holder Anderson's interest, did become a party
albeit informally, executing the Stipulation for J udg·
ment, R-39, also Satisfaction of Judgment,R-46, signing
in each instance, "Attorney for American Heritage En·
terprises, Inc., purchaser of Ezra H. Anderson and
Priel N. Anderson's interest."
The record to date lacks illucidation of the nature
of the "Anderson's interest" purchased and lacks illuci·
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dation of the "mesne conveyances by which plaintiff,
Milan M. Boyce, succeeded to American Heritage Enterprises, Inc.' s interest as purchased from Anderson."
In Stipulation and settlement of the previous case, Civil
No. 187 531, plaintiff alleges reliance on representations
from the state that access to remaining property and mill
would be afforded, R-2 (in case No. 195372); that the
state's appraisers and engineers were unaware and surprised to learn, R-3, that access would be precluded,
having discussed with this plaintiff, R-3, and with the
predecessor in title, Anderson, R-11, 12, and with another condemnee, (contract purchaser from title holder,
Anderson) , Mr. Jones, R-13, the accouterments of access
contemplated by the state's plans, i.e., approach way,
gates, usable slope, waiting pad etc., R-3. Plaintiff alleges said settlement, Civil No. 187531, was based on
mutual mistake of fact as to future access, R-3, a misunderstanding of the manner in which final road grade
would effect access and that, therefore, the representations as to basis of settlement became, albeit unintentionally so, misrepresentations, and that elimination of access was not intended, not contemplated by those in negotiation and never paid for.
Plaintiff further alleges that none of the settlement
documents mention or deal with access, R-3, and indeed,
the condemnation suit, Civil No. 187531, is silent as to
access, the Complaint, R-1 (of Civil No. 187531) not
mentioning access, the state's resolution, R-2 not dealing
with access in any way, the map exhibits and specifications attached to the Complaint not disclosing elimina-
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tion of access, R-7, 8, 9, the stipulation for judgment,
paragraph 4, R-38, containing a catch-all clause but even
there restricting the same with a language "by virtue of
the acquisition as defined in the Complaint," (which
never mentions access), the judgment on stipulation, R40, never mentioning access nor severance and even the
final order of condemnation, R-42, far from including
severance, elimination of access etc. seeming to restrict
the taking with the language, R-43, "hereinafter described is hereby taken and condemned in fee simple title
... ", and the Satisfaction of Judgment to which this
plaintiff, by predecessor or alter ego whatever, American
Heritage Enterprises, Inc., became a party, specifying
no detail as to basis of taking but referring back to the
"Judgment on stipulation," R-45.
Referring to the state's Statement of Facts, Brief
page 4, it is questionable if a "full description" of the
taking was filed since the maps, R-7, 8, 9, and the accompanying Complaint, R-1, and specifications, R-6,
never mention elimination of access.

POINT I.
THE PREVIOUS CONDEMNATION CASE
NO. 187531 DOES NOT BAR THE PRESENT
SUIT FOR DAMAGES FOR ELIMINATION
OF ACCESS.
In Fuerborn vs. State of Washington, 1961 Wash.
367 Pac, 2d 143 (cited defendant's brief, page 8), the
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Court held the State bound by its plans submitted in evidence and that if the state deviates from such plan, the
issue of damages is reopened, the Court saying, page
145:
"The principal issue in this case is: Can a condemner change his access plans (after a judgment has been entered in a condemnation case in
which such plans are submitted as evidence) in
such a manner as to further damage the condemnee' s property without payment of compensation
therefor? The trial court answered the question
in the affirmative. We hold that the answer must
be in the negative."
In that case the plan, at least according to an agreed
statement of facts, was that the county road would intersect with state primary highway by eastbound on and off
connections, "substantially level with highway." Left
turns from the county road onto the highway would not
be allowed but right turns would be; also right turns
would be permitted from the county road onto the eastbound lane of the highway. Four months later the State
Highway Commission adopted a new design eliminating
the future eastbound on and off connections to the county road, leaving access only to a frontage road with access
to the highway only at two interchanges Ilh miles to the
east and % of a mile to the west of appellant's property.
Damages had been assessed in a prior condemnation
proceeding and the referenced case was commenced because of the revision of the access plan and damages
caused by closure of the intersection as stated.
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The Court concluded, saying, page 145:
'.'· .. however, when the State elected to have the
?f damages determined in relation to the
spec1fi_c plans and evidence submitted by it, the
State is bound by such plans and evidence ...
"So if the State deviates from the plans which it
had submitted to the jury in the original condem.
nation proceedings, the issue of damages is thereby reopened. State vs. Basin Development and
Sales Company, 1958, Wash, 332 Pac, 2d 245,
where the Court said:
"'Sufficient construction plans must be pre·
sented by the condemnor so that the extent of
loss to the property owner can be understood
and translated into monetary damages. If,
after the award is made to the property owner,
the condemnor deviates from its plans in such
a way as to cause a further loss of property
value, this constitutes another condemnation
for which just compensation must again be assessed. Article 1, Sec. 16, Washington State
Constitution.
" 'The rule that gives binding effect to the con·
demnor's construction plans is merely a restatement of these principles; and the state's stipu·
lation at trial that it would be so bound was
merely a recognition of its rule as it exists.'
" ... the measure of damages is the difference be·
tween ( l) the amount of compensation that was
awarded in the Grant County Judgment for the
taking of the right of direct access to the
when plans to construct an eastbound on ,and of
ramp adjacent to the corner of appellants
erty were in evidence, and (2) the compensation
to which they would have been entitled had the
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present construction plans been placed in evidence
in the condemnation proceedings. In other words,
the measure of damages is the difference between
the amount of damage to the condemnee's property under the original plan and under the later
plans."
In the instant case it would seem that where al'
though the actual plans were not examined and levels
etc, taken by the property owners, the representations of
the state's engineers as to the nature of the taking was
relied upon and the state ought to be bound by the plans
as apparently misunderstood by its own engineers and
such misunderstandings related to and relied on by the
property owners with respect to the access, gates, apron,
fill comprising the approach way, etc.
Plaintiff in the instant case alleges, Complaint,
paragraph 4, R-2:
"Said settlement in Civil 187531 was made in reliance upon representations from the State of
Utah and its representative that access to, and
use of the remaining property and mill would not
be impaired, that an approach would be constructed with adequate driveways, waiting pad, gates
and paving from the mill located on. said first described property southward to the said 90th South
Street and that said access way would be workusable and substantially like the preable
vious access p;ior to the
and reconstruction of said 90th South Street.
Paragraph 5:
''Defendants representatives - both .appraisers
and engineers - were unaware that m fact the
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future grade of 90th South Street as it would be
constructed would preclude a workable access
f!om said mill and property; and their representations to plaintiff and to predecessors in title were
based upon their misunderstanding as to the fu.
ture diff
in elevation of said property first
above described and 90th South Street as it
would subsequently be constructed."
It is submitted here that plaintiff has proof of the
allegations of said paragraphs 4 and 5 including the allegation that the state's representatives, appraisers and engineers were unaware that, in fact, the future grade of
90th South Street as it would wind up would preclude
access to the property in question, else the allegation pre·
sumably would not have been made.

In a later Washington case, Municipality of Seattle
vs. Kenmore Properties, 1966 Wash. 410 Pac. 2d 790,
the Court denied a reassessment of damages, finding
that the condemnee had not shown a sufficient deviation
from announced plans, however the Court expressed ap·
proval of the Fuerborn case and laid down some guiding
principles. The Court said, page 793:
" ... The test of sufficiency is not one of form but
one of substance. The test of sufficiency of the
plans to be furnished the owner is whether or not
such plans properly and adequately in.form the
owner of the details of the planned takmg so he
and his witnesses may understand
the
nature of the taking and evaluate the owners re·
sulting damages."
In the instant case, the substance of the representa·
tions as to the nature of the taking was such taking as

8

would not impair access; future access was, in fact, discussed, the nature of the access detailed, the fact of future access relied upon and the State of Utah ought not
now be heard to say, and ought to be estopped from
claiming, that the fine print in its plans and measurements not known to its own appraisers and engineers
would, in fact, result in a road precluding access.
A state's appraiser is alleged to have thought the
grade would be six feet above the mill level; the state's
engineer on the job is alleged to have become cognizant
only after commencement of construction that an 18 foot
difference in grade would be accomplished precluding
access.
In an Arizona case, Olsen vs. State, 1970, Arizona,
467 Pac. 2d, 945, the Court cited with approval the
\Vashington Fuerborn case finding, however, that a
change in the median divider on the highway was within
the state's police powers and did not warrant additional
damages although not mentioned in the original condemnation proceeding, hence holding the "change of
plans" doctrine inapplicable to the case, however, the
Court approved the general proposition that the condemning authority was bound by its representations and
any change in plans constituted a further taking for
which they were entitled to just compensation citing
Herman vs. Schaffer, Arizona 467, Pac. 2d 66, Herman
vs. Tucson Title 420, Pac. 2d 286, State vs. McDonald,
352 Pac. 2d 343, and the Court said, page 948:
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".A change of plans may give rise to a cause of ac.
hon ( 1) where the circumstances are such that
the change results in construction of some feature
that would have caused some compensable dam.
age not included in the original award, or (2)
where the change results in elemination of some
feature which, although itself noncompensable
was considered in mitigation of some
element of damage."
Here, even if the original plans had indicated the
construction of a median divider as it was ultimately con·
structed, the jury could not have been permitted to con·
sider it as a compensable item.
The case points out, page 948, that one must look to
the "basis for the award of damages" to ascertain
whether the "change of plans" doctrine applies. In the
Olsen case they found that the change of plans doctrine
did not apply.
In the instant case, if we look to the original "basis"
of the award, we find that elimination of access was not
part of the basis of award, according to the pleadings
was not contemplated as a fact of the taking nor as a
factor in the award, that none of the settlement docu·
ments mentioned or dealt with the matter of access and
that representations that access would be provided were

false.
As to res judicata, 30 CJS Eminent Domain, Ar·
ticle 328, cited in defendant's Brief, page 5, the text re·
cites general principles of res judicata and with these we
have no quarrel; however, the balance of the pertinent
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text material ought to be included. The text goes on, 30
CJ S Article 328, page 206:
"However, the judgment or award is not conclusive as to matters which were not an issue nor
within the scope of the issues, citing U.S. vs. 25.4
acres of land, 71 Fed. Supp. 248, reversed on
other grounds, CCA U.S. vs. Brooklyn Gas Company, 168 Fed. 2d 291, Ark. State Highway vs.
Union Planters National Bank, 333 Southwest
2d 904, Arkansas State Highway vs. Cook, 329,
SW 2d 526, Anderson vs. Citizens Savings and
Trust, 197 Pac. 2d 113, Mihojevich vs. Harred,
375 U.S. 887, 11 Lawyers Add. 2d 117, or as to
matters
. which,, were not determined in their procee d mgs, ...
(30 CJS, page 211)

"While it is held by some authorities that the
judgment is conclusive as to damages resulting
from a proper construction and operation of the
work, whether or not they could be foreseen, by
others it is held that the owner is not concluded
as to damages which could not be foreseen or anticipated, or the possibility of which, if it had been
suggested, would have been rejected as speculative or conjectural; and it has even been held that
the judgment is not res judicata as to damages
which were not specifically considered in the proceeding. Citing Great Northern Railroad vs. City
of Seattle, 1935 Wash. 39 Pac. 2d 1001."
In that case the city's judgment condemning railroads' land for street extension, in course of which column supporting old viaduct carrying street overtracts
were replaced by columns located so close to spur as to
necessitate reconstruction thereof, was held not res judi11

cata of railroad's action for reconstruction costs, notwith.
standing blueprint attached to stipulation for judgment
in condemnation suit, plainly indicated that new row of
columns would interfere with operation of trains on spur
track in question and would necessitate relocation thereof, where such damage was not specifically considered in
condemnation proceedings.
The Court noted that neither in the ordinance nor
the petition for condemnation nor the stipulation for
judgment nor the judgment itself was mention made of
possible damage to the railroad's franchise rights on
Jackson street. There was a blueprint, which showed a
general plan for the construction, the same indicated a
row of columns supporting the west end of the Jackson
Street viaduct and the state claimed that from the plan
ect. the item for damages for removal and reconstruction
of the spur was put in issue and that the railroad having
failed to claim damages for said item is now barred by
the judgment in the previous case. The Court held no
so, saying page 1001:
"Doctrine of res judicata will not be invoked to
sustain a city's claim of right to take or damage a
distinct and separate property right which was
not specifically included in the
pro·
ceedings, and for which compensation was not
made. Citing Spokane vs. Colby;, 48 Pac. 248,
Hinkley vs. Seattle, 132 Pac. 855.
The Court pointed out that it was important that"Here, the condemnation suit was instituted and
carried to judgment prior to the commencement
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of the
..
had the right to
assume that the city, m makmg the improvement,
any of its property
would not take or
other than that spec1f1cally described in the stipulation and judgment ..."
A further note under 30 CJS, Article 328, Eminent
Domain, Section B, "Damages" cites Reid Creamery and
Dairy Supply vs. Philadelphia, 118 Atl. 11, Pa. 1922,
the note reading:
"Where any municipality, in widening a street
and altering a grade for which damages were
awarded abutting property, made a slope or fill
extending beyond the line fixed by the condemning ordinance and there appeared no taking
beyond such line, the slope or fill cannot be considered as a necessary consequence of widening
or elevating the grade, and it was not necessary
to demand relief therefor in the original award."
In that case it was not anticipated that the fill in
question would extend as far as it actually extended. In
the instant case it was simply not anticipated by anyone
concerned that access was so completely eliminated as it
was.
Another recent case covering change of plans is
State vs. Stubbs, Arizona 196 .... , 420, Pac, 2d 286.
It is submitted that in the instant case and absence
of specification in the plans that access would be eliminated, together with representation as alleged, of engineers and appraisers that access would be afforded, is
certainly equivalent to "change of plans" as noted in the
w·ashington, Arizona and other cases.
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POINT II.
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT IS THE OWNER
OF THE PROPERTY INCLUDING DAMAGES FOR ELIMINATION OF ACCESS.
With respect to the ownership of plaintiff in the
property rights condemned, plaintiff as a purchaser
stands in the shoes of the predecessor, Ezra H. Anderson, having purchased the fee title from the Anderson
together with all rights incidental thereto including the
condemnation cause of action and plaintiff was a party
to the stipulation and settlement, executing the same by
counsel as purchaser of the Ezra H. and Priel N. Anderson interest, R-39; also the satisfaction, R-36; and
plaintiff has not yet had an opportunity to prove the
nature and extent of the assignment to him although he
alleges same in his Complaint, R-1, and the acquisition
by plaintiff of all rights held by the predecessor, Ezra
H. and Priel N. Anderson, actual title holders at the
instant of service of Summons, can be inferred rather
conclusively from the letter (R-10, 11, 12) supplied
plaintiff by the Andersons.

Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 2, Article
5.21, Vendor and Vendee, reads in part:
"Where the conveyance takes place subsequent to
the making of the award prior to paY:ment, and
the deed contains no reference to the right of the
award, it has been held that the purchaser is entitled to the award, citing Bank of America vs.
Glendale, 2 Pac. 2d 1035, Hamilton vs. Big Med-
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icine Drainage District, 261SW940, Mo., Griffit
vs. Pocahontas County Drainage District, Iowa
166 NW 570."
It is true that either party might have elicited by
discovery means, documents in question, including those
showing the identity of, or connection between so-called
"purchaser of Ezra H. and Priel N. Anderson's interest," R-39, and 46, American Heritage Enterprises, Inc.,
and the named plaintiff, Milan M. Boyce, however, this
never became necessary in the proceedings to date, the
lower court being convinced of the plaintiff's interest and
the plaintiff enjoying, at this stage, the allegation of his
Complaint, R-1, taken in the light most favorable to him,
that he "is the owner of" the property in question; that
representations to and dealings with condemnee were
with "plaintiff and predecessors in title," R-3, (of case
No. 195372) and that by reason of the "elimination of
access from said 90th South Street," R-4, this "plaintiff
is damaged in a substantial sum according to evidence
which will be presented by appraisers," page 4, is the real
party in interest, the one, as alleged, suffering the damages, and should be accorded a right to show the details
of his right to such damages, if damages are payable for
the elimination of access (which was obviously never
considered by any of the parties involved) .

POINT Ill.
THE STATE IS ESTOPPED TO DENY REPRESENTATIONS OF ITS ENGINEERS AND
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APPRAISERS THAT ITS PLANS WOULD
AFFORD ACCESS.
Plaintiff has no quarrel with the defendant's recitation in its Point III, Brief, 12, of general rules respecting claims against the state, however, in eminent domain
proceedings the state consents to be sued by any and all
parties damaged78-34-7. Who may appear and defend.-All
persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an

interest in, any of the property described in the
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, though not named, may appear, plead and def end, each in respect to his own property or interest, or that claimed by him, in the same manner
as if named in the complaint.
Article 1, Sec. 22, Constitution of Utah-Section 22, (Private Property for Public Use), page
173, Vol. 1. Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compen·
sation.

It is interesting that the governmental immunity
act, heavily relied on by defendant, Brief, page 13, recites among other things,
63-30-15, Waiver of Immunity as to Contract·

ual Obligation.-Immunity from suit of all gov·
ernmental entities is waived as to any contractual
obligation.

Although the right of eminent domain is a right o.f
sovereignty rather than of contract, 26-AmJ ur 2d,
nent Domain, Article 3, Rationale or Basi,s of Power, it
is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation.
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Article 1, Sec. 22, Constitution of Utah, and where the
jury does not assess the compensation, compensation becomes a matter of contract, a what-for-what consideration necessitating a consideration of, and delineation of,
what is offered or taken, and what is paid therefor, and
misrepresentations in connection therewith by the State,
or mistake of fact, mutual or otherwise, by the parties
engaged in necessary negotiation, would be incidental to
the contract being arrived at, and damages or omissions
therein causing damages to a plaintiff such as in this, the
instant case, based on eminent domain and contract considerations not based upon misrepresentations of a public employee which may or may not be barred by the governmental immunity acts, but on which the instant suit
is not predicated.
POINT IV.
THE PREVIOUS CONDEMNATION CASE
NO. 187531 NEVER CONTEMPLATED NOR
DEALT WITH NOR PROVIDED COMPENSATION FOR ELIMINATION OF ACCESS.
The complete absence of any mention of limitation
of, or elimination or access in the entire proceedings as
set forth in Statement of Facts, both in the condemnation Complaint and the plans and specifications attached
thereto, the sttipulation for settlement and judgment,
R-37, the judgment on stipulation, R-40, and the final
order of condemnation, R-42, is extremely persuasive of
plaintiff's allegation, R-2 and 3 (of Civil No. 195372)
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that the taking of access was not a basis of the condem.
nation and payment.
26 Arn J ur 2d, Eminent Domain, Article 17 5, ...
Access recites:
also an owner's rights of access to his premises
IS a valuable property right and cannot be taken
without compensation. Rothwell v. Linzell, Ohio
127 NE 2d 524, 350 US 1012 (appeal dismissed).
43 ALR 2d, page 1074 Limited Access recites:
Where an established land service road in which
the normal right of access had already come into
being is converted into a limited access way in
such a manner that the existing rights of access
are destroyed, the owners of such rights are en·
titled to compensation, exactly as they would be
if such rights were destroyed by any other type of
construction.
The word "taking" includes cases in which the
access to abutting premises is obstructed by the
change of grade of a highway . . ." White v.
Southern Railroad, S.C. 140 SE 560, 57 ALR
634. Cited in 26 Am J ur 2d Imminent Domain,
page 922.
Such "cut-off of access" is a taking within the
meaning of a constitutional provision requiring
compensation to be made for property taken for
public use, Walters v. Baltimore Railroad, Md.
88 Atlantic 47.
Specifically on the question of grade, Morgan
County vs. Goans, Tenn. 198 SW 69 5 ALR 198, holds:
One having an easement. in a
from
his premises to a main highway Is entitled to re·
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damages for the alterations of the grade of
a highway so as to cut off access to the highway
by means of the road.
As to impairment of access and security of travel,
43 ALR 2d recites:
The cases have apparently recognized that the
landowner is entitled to compensation where his
direct right of access is taken even though other,
but less satisfactory means of access are available,
citing People v. Picciardi 1943 Calif. 144 Pac 2d
799.
The defendant state has not claimed in its Brief,
but is expected to claim in this case that the settlement
is released and covers damages for elemination of access
although not mentioned. In the stipulation for judgment, R-37, R-38, far from being broad, the language restricts the damages to "the acquisition as defined in the
Complaint" which, as pointed out, fails to mention elimination of access, as does the plans thereto attached, R-7,
8, 9 (of Civil No. 187531).
45 Am Jur "Release" Article 28, Intention of Parties recites:
"A person cannot release a claim of which he has
no knowledge and of the existance of which he has
been fraudulantly kept in ignorance. Citing
Cooper vs. Hayward, Minn. 74 NW 152.
also the following with respect to construction:
That "general words . . . shall be
m?st
strongly against the rel:asor . . . . Citmg U nzon
Pacific Railroad vs. Artists, 8 Cir. 60 Fed. 365,
23 LRA 581.
19

As to Unknown Claims, Am Jur recites:
If it is his
to do so a person may, by hii
general release, discharge a claim the existence
o.f which is
to him. But the
rooted m eqmty that when an instrument
is so general i? its terms as to release the rights of
a pa.rty of which he was ignorant, and which were
not m contemplation of the bargain at the timeit
was made, the instrument will be restrained to the
purposes of the bargain, and the release confined
to the right intended to be released.
P. 694, n. 13, Clancy V Pacenti, 15 Ill App 2d
171, 145 NE2d 802. 71 ALR2d 77.
Anno: 171 ALR 185; 71 ALR2d 156.
It has been held that a release will not apply to
unknown claims in the absence of a showing, apart
from the words of the release, of an intent to in·
elude such claims. Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal 2d 97,
28 Cal Rptr 307. 378 P2d 579.

It has been held that release of all claims for
known injuries is a bar to recovery for unknown
consequences of the known injuries, but not to
recover for unknown injuries not within the con·
templation of the parties at the time of
ing for the release; a release expressly
unknown injuries is binding if the parties did ID
fact intentionally agree upon a settlement there·
for, but is not a bar to an action for the
injuries if it can be shown that such un.known m·
juries were not within the contemplation of the
parties when the settlement was agreed upond
Arnovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn 237. 56 NW 2
570. 34 ALR2d 1306.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that its Complaint herein, R-1
(of Civil No. 195372) with affidavits, R-10, 11, 12 and
13, read in the light most favorable to plaintiff, alleges
and sets forth an eminent domain taking of a property
right, access, never contemplated in the earlier proceeding and not compensated for and this by reason of mutual mistake of all parties concerned as to future access.
The nature of plaintiff's Assignment and the details
uf the "mesne conveyances" alleged in plaintiff's complaint, R-1, are matters of proof and need only be alleged
generally and it was as incumbent on defendant as upon
plaintiff to inquire of the details of the assignments, Anderson to Boyce or American Heritage or to Jones and
plaintiff ought not to suffer denial of opportunity to
prove the foregoing and concedes he cannot add to the
record at this time, but is entitled to enjoy the broadest
possible interpretation of the language of his Complaint.
Plaintiff-respondent submits his Complaint states
a cause of action and that the case should be remanded
for further discovery and proof on the issues presented.
Respectfully submitted,
GAYLE DEAN HUNT
Attorney for Plainiff-Respondent
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